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Abstract
The existing literature on optimal taxation typically assumes there exists a capacity
to implement complex tax schemes, which is not necessarily the case for many developing
countries. We examine the determinants of optimal redistributive policies in the context
of a developing country that can only implement linear tax policies due to administrative
reasons. Further, the reduction of poverty is typically the expressed goal of such countries,
and this feature is also taken into account in our model. We derive the optimality condi-
tions for linear income taxation, commodity taxation, and public provision of private and
public goods for the poverty minimization case, and compare the results to those derived
under a general welfarist objective function. We also study the implications of informal-
ity on optimal redistributive policies for such countries. The exercise reveals non-trivial
differences in optimal tax rules under the different assumptions.
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1 Introduction
High levels of within-country inequality in many otherwise successful developing countries
has become a key policy concern in global development debate. While some countries have
very unequal inherent distributions (e.g. due to historical land ownership arrangements),
in others the fruits of economic growth have been unequally shared. No matter what the
underlying reason for the high inequality, often the only direct way for governments to affect
the distribution of income is via redistributive tax and transfer systems. Clearly, public
spending on social services also has an impact on the distribution of well-being, although some
of the effects (such as skill-enhancing impacts from educational investment) only materialize
over a longer time horizon.
Reflecting the desire to reduce poverty and inequality, redistributive transfer systems
have, indeed, proliferated in many developing countries. Starting from Latin America, they
are now spreading to low-income countries, including those in Sub-Saharan Africa.1 In low-
income countries, in particular, redistributive arrangements via transfers are still at an early
stage, and they often consist of isolated, donor-driven, programs. There is an urgent and well-
recognized need to move away from scattered programs to more comprehensive tax-benefit
systems.
This paper examines the optimal design of cash transfers, commodity taxes (or subsidies),
the provision of public and private goods (such as education and housing), and financing them
by a linear income tax. The paper also includes an analysis of optimal income taxation in the
presence of an informal sector. The paper therefore provides an overview of many of the most
relevant instruments for redistributive policies that are needed for a system-wide analysis of
social protection. We build on the optimal income tax approach, which is extensively used
in the developed country context2, but much less applied for the design of redistributive sys-
tems in developing country circumstances. This approach, initiated by Mirrlees (1971), allows
for a rigorous treatment of efficiency concerns (e.g. the potentially harmful effect of distor-
tionary taxation on employment) and redistributive objectives. Achieving the government’s
redistributive objectives is constrained by limited information: the social planner cannot di-
rectly observe individuals’ income earning capacity, and therefore it needs to base its tax and
transfer policies on observable variables, such as gross income. The most general formulation
of optimal tax models apply non-linear tax schedules, but in a developing country context,
using fully non-linear taxes is rarely feasible. In this paper we therefore limit the analysis to
redistributive linear income taxes, which combine a lump-sum transfer with a proportional
income tax, and which can be implemented by withholding at source if necessary.
Linear income taxes are not very common in practice: less than 30 countries had flat
tax rates for personal income in 2012, with some concentration in ex-Soviet Eastern Europe
1For a recent treatment and survey, see Barrientos (2013).
2See IFS and Mirrlees (2011) for an influential application of optimal tax theory to policy analysis for rich
countries.
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(Peichl 2014). It is noteworthy that even though flat taxes are not particularly common in
low-income countries, in many instances in such countries the progressive income tax reaches
only a small share of the population. This would indicate that despite the existence of a
progressive income tax, these countries do not yet possess enough tax capacity to implement
well-functioning progressive income taxes. This is one motivation for our interest of modeling
optimal linear taxes. Peichl (2014) suggests that simplification benefits can be especially
relevant for developing countries.3
In conventional optimal taxation models, the government’s objective function is modeled
as a social welfare function, which depends directly on individual utilities. We depart from
this welfarist approach by presenting general non-welfarist tax rules, as in Kanbur, Pirttilä,
and Tuomala (2006), and, in particular, optimal tax and public good provision rules when the
government is assumed to minimize poverty. We have chosen this approach as it resembles well
the tone of much of policy discussion in developing countries, including the MDGs and the new
SDGs, where the objective is explicitly to reduce poverty rather than maximize well-being.4
Similarly, the discussion regarding cash transfer systems is often couched especially in terms
of poverty alleviation. While we do not necessarily want to advocate poverty mininimization
over other social objectives, we regard examining its implications, and contrasting them with
traditional welfaristic approaches, useful. Using non-welfarist objectives is, as such, nothing
new in economics. In fact, as Sen (1985) has argued, one can be critical of utiliarianism for
many reasons. Note also that the objective of poverty minimization is not at odds with the
restriction of a linear tax scheme that we impose: a flat tax regime together with a lump-sum
income transfer component can achieve similar amounts of redistribution towards the poor as
a progressive tax system, if specified suitably (Keen, Kim, and Varsano (2008); Peichl (2014)).
In all our analysis, we first present welfarist tax rules (which are mostly already available in
the literature) to provide a benchmark to examine how applying poverty minimization as an
objective changes the optimal tax and public service provision rules.
We also deal with some extensions to existing models, which are motivated by the de-
veloping country context, such as the case where public provision affects the individuals’
income-earning capacity, thus capturing (albeit at a very stylized way) possibilities to affect
their capabilities. An important feature to take into account in tax analysis of developing
countries is the presence of a large informal sector, and we also examine the implications of
this for optimal redistributive policies.
Our paper is related to various strands of earlier literature. First, Kanbur, Keen, and
Tuomala (1994) and Pirttilä and Tuomala (2004) study optimal income tax and commodity
tax rules, respectively, from the poverty alleviation point of view, but their papers build on
the non-linear tax approach which is not well suited to developing countries. Kanbur and
Keen (1989) do consider linear income taxation together with poverty minimization, but they
3Note that it might be reasonable for some countries to move to a progressive income tax system as their
tax capacity increases with development; the study of such dynamics is beyond the scope of this paper.
4In fact, the first SDG is simply “End poverty in all of its forms everywhere”.
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do not produce optimal tax rules but focus on a tax reform perspective, and provide tax rate
simulations. Others have considered different departures from the welfarist standard. For
example, Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2007) consider fairness as an objective of the tax-transfer
system and its implications on optimal taxation. Roemer et al. (2003) employ a maxi-min type
of social goal and characterize how well tax-and transfer systems achieve the goal of equality of
opportunity. Second, our work is related to new contributions in behavioural public finance,
which address the situation where the behavioral biases of the individuals lead the social
planner to adopt a different objective function than the individuals have; see Chetty (2015);
Gerritsen (2015); Farhi and Gabaix (2015). A third strand of literature considers taxation
and development more generally, such as Gordon and Li (2009), Keen (2012; 2009) and Besley
and Persson (2013).5 This field, while clearly very relevant, has not concentrated much on
the design of optimal redistributive systems. Finally, optimal linear income taxation has been
studied from the standard welfarist perspective. We describe these models in section 2.1. The
most recent description of linear income tax models can be found in Piketty and Saez (2013).
They also emphasize how linear tax rules, while analytically more feasible, provide the same
intuition as the more complicated non-linear models. The linear tax rules, they argue, are
robust to alternative specifications6, and examining this forms part of our motivation: we
study optimal linear tax policies, in our understanding for the first time, from the poverty
minimization perspective.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 examines optimal linear income taxation, while
3 turns to optimal provision rules for publicly provided private and public goods that are
financed by such a linear income tax. Section 4 analyzes the combination of optimal linear
income taxes and commodity taxation and asks under which conditions one should use differ-
entiated commodity taxation if the government is interested in poverty minimization and also
has optimal cash transfers at its disposal. The question on how optimal poverty-minimizing
income tax policies are altered in the presence of an informal sector is examined in Section
5, whereas Section 6 presents a numerical illustration of optimal income taxation for poverty
minimization. Finally, conclusions are provided in section 7.
2 Linear income taxation
2.1 Optimal linear income taxation under the welfarist objective
In this section we give an overview of some of the models and results for optimal linear income
taxation as they have been presented in the literature. Many formulae for optimal taxation
were developed in the 1970s and 1980s (see Dixit and Sandmo (1977), Tuomala (1985) and
5Besley and Persson (2013) use a model with groups that can differ in their income-earning abilities. Their
analysis focuses, however, on explaining how economic development and tax capacity are interrelated, and not
on redistribution between individuals.
6They also describe some implications of departures from the welfarist standard in the optimal nonlinear
tax model.
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the survey by Tuomala (1990)), and they are still being used, whereas Piketty and Saez (2013)
offer fresh expressions of the tax rules. Our exposition mainly follows that of Tuomala (1985),
but the Appendix shows how the results relate to those in Piketty and Saez (2013).
The government collects a linear income tax τ , which it uses to finance a lump-sum trans-
fer b, along with other exogenous public spending R. The individuals differ in their income-
earning capacity (wi), and zi denotes individual labor income (wiLi, where Li represents
hours worked). Consumption equals ci = (1− τ)zi + b, where the superscript-i refers to indi-
viduals.7 There is a discrete distribution of N individuals, whose heterogeneous preferences
over consumption and labor are captured by the utility function ui(ci, zi). The maximized
(subject to the individual budget constraint) value of this utility function is captured by the
indirect utility function, which is denoted by V i(1− τ, b), and we refer to the net-of tax rate
as 1 − τ = a. To simplify notation, subscript-a refers to the derivative with respect to the
net-of-tax rate.
The government has redistributive objectives represented by a Bergson-Samuelson func-
tional W
(
V 1, ..., V N
)
with W ′ > 0, W ′′ < 0. The government’s problem is to choose the tax
rate τ and transfer b so as to maximize the social welfare function ∑W (V i(a, b)) under the
budget constraint (1 − a)∑ zi = Nb + R.8 We denote the social marginal utility of income
by βi = WV V ib .
All the mathematical details are presented in Appendix A. There it is shown that the
optimal tax rule is given by
τ∗
1− τ∗ =
1
ε
(
1− z(β)
z¯
)
, (2.1)
where ε = dz¯d(1−τ)
(1−τ)
z¯ is the elasticity of total income with respect to the net-of-tax rate, z¯
is average income and z(β) =
∑
βizi∑
βi
welfare-weighted average income. Define Ω = z(β)z¯ , so
that I = 1−Ω is a normative measure of inequality or, equivalently, of the relative distortion
arising from the second-best tax system. Clearly Ω should vary between zero and unity. One
would expect it to be a decreasing function of τ (given the per capita revenue requirement
g = R/N). There is a minimum feasible level of τ for any given positive g, and of course g must
not be too large, or no equilibrium is possible. Hence any solution must also satisfy τ > τmin
if the tax system is to be progressive. That is, if the tax does not raise sufficient revenue to
finance the non-transfer expenditure, R, the shortfall must be made up by imposing a poll
tax (b < 0) on each individual. One would also expect the elasticity of labor supply with
respect to the net-of-tax rate to be an increasing function of τ (it need not be).
We can rewrite (2.1) as τ∗ = 1−Ω1−Ω+ε to illustrate the basic properties of the optimal tax
rate. Because ε ≥ 0 and 0 ≤ Ω < 1, both the numerator and denominator are non-negative.
7We consider “income” here as the labor income of individuals, but, considering that our model is intended
especially for the poorer countries, agricultural income could as well be included in the concept of income. In
Section 5 we discuss the implications of untaxed home consumption in agricultural production.
8Summation is always over all individuals i, which is suppressed for simplification.
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The optimal tax rate is thus between zero and one. The formula captures neatly the efficiency-
equity trade off. τ decreases with ε and Ω and we have the following general results: 1) In
the extreme case where Ω = 1, i.e. the government does not value redistribution at all, τ = 0
is optimal. We can call this case libertarian. According to the libertarian view the level of
disposable income is irrelevant (ruling out both basic income b, and other public expenditures,
g, funded by the government). 2) If there is no inequality, then again Ω = 1 and τ = 0. There
is no intervention by the government. The inherent inequality will be fully reflected in the
disposable income. Furthermore, lump-sum taxation is optimal; b = −g or T = −b. 3) We can
call the case where Ω = 0 as “Rawlsian” or maxi-min preferences. The government maximizes
tax revenue (optimal τ = 11+ε) as it maximizes the basic income b (assuming the worst off
individual has zero labor income). In fact, maximizing b can be regarded as a non-welfarist
case, which is the focus in the next sub-section.
2.2 Optimal linear income taxation under non-welfarist objectives
A non-welfarist government is one that follows a different set of preferences than those em-
ployed by individuals themselves (Kanbur, Pirttilä, and Tuomala (2006)). Thus, instead of
maximizing a function of individual utilities, the government has other, paternalistic objec-
tives that go beyond utilities. A special case taken up in more detail below is the objective
of minimizing poverty in the society. To be as general as possible, let us define a ’social eval-
uation function’ (as in e.g. Kanbur, Pirttilä, and Tuomala (2006)) as S = ∑F (ci, zi), which
the government maximizes instead of the social welfare function. F (ci, zi) measures the social
value of consumption ci for a person with income zi and can be related to u(ci, zi) but is not
restricted to it. Following Tuomala’s model as above, given the instruments available, linear
income tax τ , lump-sum grant b and other expenditure R the government thus maximizes∑
F (azi + b, zi) subject to the budget constraint (1− a)∑ zi −Nb = R. Define∑(
Fc(zi + azia) + Fzzia
)∑ (
Fc(1 + azib) + Fzzib
) ≡ F˜ , (2.2)
which reflects the relative impact of taxes and transfers on the social evaluation function.
Using this definition, and following the same steps as in the previous section (see Appendix),
the optimal tax rate becomes:
τ∗
1− τ∗ =
1
ε
(
1− F˜
z¯
)
. (2.3)
The result resembles the welfarist tax rule in (2.1). In addition to labor supply considerations
via the term 1ε , they both entail a term that measures the relative benefits of taxes and
transfers, in the welfarist case via welfare-weighted income, in the non-welfarist case via F˜ ,
the relative impact on the social evaluation function. Note that since under non-welfarism
individuals are not necessarily at their utility optimum, the envelope condition does not apply
and thus the behavioral responses zia and zib are not cancelled out in F˜ . That is, the impacts of
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tax changes on labor supply are not trivial under non-welfarism. The terms ∑ zia (Fca+ Fz)
in the numerator and ∑ zib (Fca+ Fz) in the denominator of (2.2) capture these effects on the
the social evaluation function. If taxation had no behavioral impacts (zia = zib = 0), it would
affect the value of the social evaluation function only by mechanically altering individual
after-tax income. Note that in this case, F˜ =
∑
Fczi∑
Fc
would be a more direct equivalent to
z(β) =
∑
βizi∑
βi
. Thus, F˜ would be a purely redistributive term, albeit a non-welfaristic one.
Paternalistic concerns also enter the optimal tax rule via labor supply changes, captured by the
response of z. In this way, the tax rule in (2.3) can be decomposed, and this decomposition
is similar in the spirit to the corrective parts of the tax formulae in the new optimal tax
literature with behavioral agents, such as Farhi and Gabaix (2015) and Gerritsen (2015).
The signs and magnitudes of Fc and Fz and thus of F˜ depend on the specific objective
of the government, that is, on the shape of F . Let us consider the specific case of poverty
minimization below.
2.2.1 Special case: Poverty minimization
Now let us derive the optimal linear tax results for a government whose objective is to minimize
poverty in society. The instruments available to the government are the same, τ and b, and
other exogenous expenditure is R. Note first that the revenue-maximizing tax rate is in
fact equivalent to the tax rate obtained from a maxi-min objective function, since when the
government only cares about the poverty (consumption) of the poorest individual, its only
goal is to maximize redistribution to this individual, i.e. maximize tax revenue.
Let us first define the objective function of the government explicitly. Poverty is defined
as deprivation of individual consumption ci relative to some desired level c¯ and measured
with a deprivation index D
(
ci, c¯
)
, such that D > 0 ∀ c ∈ [0, c¯) and D = 0 otherwise, and
Dc < 0, Dcc ≥ 0 ∀ c ∈ [0, c¯), as in Pirttilä and Tuomala (2004). A typical example of such an
index would be the Pα family of Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (FGT) poverty indices. We discuss
the application of FGT indices in our model in Appendix B. Note, however, that the choice of
poverty index depends on the preferences of the government, whether they wish to minimize
the total amount of deprivation in the society, or are for instance concerned especially about
the incomes of the poorest of the poor. The social evaluation function F (ci, zi) becomes
D
(
ci, c¯
)
and the objective function is min P = ∑D (ci, c¯). Now Fc = Dc and Fz = 0, so
F˜ = D˜ =
∑
Dc
(
zi + azia
)∑
Dc
(
1 + azib
) , (2.4)
and the optimal tax rule becomes:
τ∗
1− τ∗ =
1
ε
(
1− D˜
z¯
)
. (2.5)
Since now Fz = 0, the result is closer to (2.1) than (2.3) was, although part of the labor
supply impacts still remain. Here D˜ describes the relative efficiency of taxes and transfers
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in reducing deprivation. Both the numerator and denominator of D˜ depend on Dc, so the
difference in the relative efficiency of the two depends on zia and zib. The more people react to
taxes (relative to transfers) by earning less, the higher is D˜ and the lower should the tax rate
be. In (2.1), the higher is the social value of income, the higher is z(β) and the lower should
the tax rate be.
Since the form of the result is similar in the welfarist and the poverty minimization cases,
the analysis could be also seen as a special case of the argument in Saez and Stantcheva
(2016), who derived generalized social welfare weights and express the tax formulae in terms
of those.9 Here, the generalized social welfare weight would thus be derived from a poverty
minimization objective. It could be close to a suitably defined welfarist criterion, clearly
it would be exactly the same only if the welfarist criterion would correspond to the chosen
poverty minimization objective.
We can also rewrite D˜, using a = 1−τ , as:
∑
Dc
(
zi+(1−τ) ∂zi
∂(1−τ)
)
∑
Dc(1+(1−τ)zib)
=
∑
Dc
(
1+ (1−τ)
zi
∂zi
∂(1−τ)
)
zi∑
Dc(1+(1−τ)zib)
=∑
Dc(1+εi)zi∑
Dc(1+(1−τ)zib)
. Thus the D˜ in the optimal tax result (2.5) entails a further consideration
that depends on labor supply responses. It combines paternalistic preferences – how much
poverty is reduced — with the behavioral responses to a tax system – how much labor income
increases when the take-home-pay goes up. The latter effect tends to lower the optimal tax
rate to induce the poor to work more. Kanbur, Keen, and Tuomala (1994) find a similar
result in their nonlinear poverty-minimizing tax model. Here, however, we are restricted to
lower the tax on everyone instead of only the poorest individuals.
To summarize, the nonwelfarist tax rules differ from the welfarist ones, depending on
the definition of nonwelfarism in question (the Fc and Fz terms). However, when we take
poverty minimization as the specific case of nonwelfarism, the tax rules are quite similar to
welfarist ones. The basic difference is that equity is not considered in welfare terms but
in terms of poverty reduction effectiveness. A more notable difference arises from efficiency
considerations. With linear taxation, taking into account labor supply responses means that
everybody’s tax rate is affected, instead of just the target group’s. If we want to induce the
poor to work more to reduce their poverty, we need to lower everyone’s tax rate. The welfarist
linear tax rule does not take this into account. It is not however possible to state that under
poverty-minimization tax rates are optimally lower than under welfare maximization, since
we cannot directly compare the welfare and deprivation terms. However there is an additional
efficiency consideration involved under poverty minimization. Nonlinear tax rules of course
make it possible to target lower tax rates on the poorer individuals, but in a developing
country context with lower administrative capacity this is not necessarily possible, and such
considerations affect everyone’s tax rate.
9We are grateful to a referee for this point.
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3 Public good provision with linear income taxes
3.1 Optimal public provision under the welfarist objective
Let us first extend the welfarist model of linear taxation to include the provision of pure public
goods. The government offers a universal pure public good G, which enters individual utilities
in addition to the consumption of private goods. The government’s objective function is now∑
W
(
V i(a, b,G)
)
, whereas the budget constraint becomes (1 − a)∑ zi − Nb − NpiG = R
where pi is the producer price of the public good. The consumer price of private consumption
is normalized to 1. Let us now define the marginal willingness to pay for the public good
by the expression σ = VGVb and σ
∗ =
∑
βiσi∑
βi
as the welfare weighted average marginal rate of
substitution between public good and income for individual i. The rule for public provision
can then be written as
pi = σ∗ − τ (σ∗z¯b − z¯G) . (3.1)
This public good provision rule is a version of a modified Samuelson rule. It equates the
relative cost of providing the public good to the welfare weighted sum of marginal rates of
substitution (MRS). It also includes a revenue term, which takes into account the impacts of
public good provision and income transfers on labor supply and thus tax revenue.
Consider first the case when labor supply does not depend on public good provision and
there are no income effects, i.e. z¯G = z¯b = 0. Then we are left with a more familiar rule
that welfare-weighted aggregate MRS must equal the cost of the public good. When we add
income effects so that z¯b < 0, and since σ∗ is positive, then because of the second term in
(3.1), the financing costs of the public good are reduced. Likewise, if labor supply and public
provision are positively related, the financing costs of the public good are reduced.
3.2 Optimal provision of public goods under poverty minimization
Now consider a non-welfarist government interested in minimizing poverty. The public good
G which it offers, enters the deprivation index separately from other, private consumption x:
D
(
x,G, x¯, G¯
)
. The government still offers a lump-sum cash transfer b as well, and finances
its expenses with the linear income tax τ .
Again alternative formulations of the public good provision rule can be written. The first
is
pi = D∗ − τ (D∗z¯b − z¯G) , (3.2)
which can be compared with equation (3.1). Here, D∗ =
∑
DG+
∑
DxaziG∑
Dx(1+azib)
captures the ef-
ficiency of the public good in reducing deprivation relative to the income transfer (because
DG, Dx < 0, D∗ > 0). Again, if z¯G = z¯b = 0, the equation reduces to pi = D∗ =
∑
DG∑
Dx
. This
rule highlights a considerable difference to the standard modified Samuelson rules, reflecting
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instead of a welfare-based MRS the direct poverty reduction impact of the public good. With
z¯G 6= 0 and z¯b 6= 0, D∗ also depends on the indirect impacts of the public good via labor
supply on consumption. As previously, the right-hand side includes a tax revenue term. Using
the same example as in the context of (3.1), if z¯G = 0 and z¯b < 0, the price pi of the public
good would be higher than its relative efficiency in eliminating deprivation.
Here we have allowed the government to be directly interested in the consumption of some
pure public good. But if the government is solely interested in reducing income-poverty, it
might not include such goods in the deprivation measure.10 However, suppose that individual
welfare does not directly depend on the public good provided but the public good can have
a productivity increasing impact. An example could be publicly provided education services
that affect individuals’ productivity via the wage rate. We therefore suppose that the direct
impact of the public good on deprivation cancels out (i.e. DG = 0), whereas the wage rate
becomes an increasing function of G, i.e. w′(G) > 0 (denoting z = w(G)L). This means that
the expression for D∗ is rewritten as
D∗ =
∑
Dxa
(
w ∂L∂G + w′L
)
∑
Dx
(
1 + aw ∂L∂b
) . (3.3)
This means that even if labor supply would not react to changes in public good provision,
such provision would still be potentially desirable through its impact on the wage rate. In this
way, public good provision can be interpreted as increasing the capability of the individuals
to earn a living wage, which serves as a poverty reducing tool, and which can in some cases
be a more effective way to reduce poverty rather than direct cash transfers. The optimality
depends on the relative strength of w′(G) > 0 versus the direct impact of the transfers.
An alternative provision rule for the public good, which results from extending the Piketty-
Saez approach, in the usual case where it also enters individuals’ utility function is
´ (
DG +Dx(1− τ)∂zi∂G
)
dν(i)´
Dx dν(i)
= pi − τ dZ
dG
. (3.4)
In the numerator of the left-hand side, the first term is the direct deprivation effect of G
and the second term captures the indirect deprivation effect, operating via the labor supply
impacts of the public good, which affect the level of private consumption, x. These impacts
are scaled by the poverty alleviation impact of private consumption itself (the impact of a cash
transfer). The right-hand side reflects the costs of public good provision: besides the direct
cost of the good there is an indirect tax revenue effect operating through labor supply. The
condition is directly comparable to the welfarist rule, given in (A.22) in the Appendix, because
even though the welfarist case relies on utilities, in the FOC for G no envelope condition is
evoked. The only difference between equations (A.22) and (3.4) is that the utility and welfare
weight terms are exchanged for deprivation terms.
10See also Appendix B for multidimensional considerations in poverty measurement.
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Consider finally the provision of a quasi-private good, such that in addition to the publicly
provided amount, individuals can purchase (“top-up”) the good themselves as well. The good
is denoted by s and its total amount consists of private purchases h and public provision G:
s = G + h. In addition to good s, individuals consume other private goods, denoted by x.
The individual budget constraint is thus ci = xi+phi = (1−τ)zi+τZ(1−τ)−R−piG, where
p is the consumer price of private purchases of the quasi-private good. The producer price of
education in the private sector (p) or in the public sector (pi) can be equal, or one sector could
have access to cheaper technology. Deprivation is determined in terms of consumption of x
and s, so the objective function is min P =
´
D
(
xi, si, x¯, s¯
)
dν(i). In this case, the provision
rule is
´ [
Dx
(
(1− τ)∂zi∂s ∂s∂G − p∂h
i
∂G
)
+Ds ∂s
i
∂G
]
dν(i)´
Dx dν(i)
= pi − τ dZ
dG
. (3.5)
The result is analogous to the pure public good result in (3.4), with the difference that now
the impact G has on poverty depends on whether public provision fully crowds out private
purchases of the good (i.e. dhdG = −1 ⇔ dsdG = 0) or not (i.e. dhdG = 0 ⇔ dsdG = 1). If there is
full crowding out, an increase in public provision of G that is fully funded via a corresponding
increase in the tax rate has no impact on the consumption of s and consequently no impact
on poverty. If there is no crowding out however, the FOC becomes
´ [
Dx
(
(1− τ)∂zi∂s
)
+Ds
]
dν(i)´
Dx dν(i)
= pi − τ dZ
dG
, (3.6)
which is the same as in the case of a pure public good in equation (3.4).
To summarize, the welfarist public provision rule, when public goods are financed with lin-
ear income taxes and supplemented with lump-sum transfers, differs from the standard mod-
ified Samuelson rule. It equates a welfare-weighted sum of MRS to the marginal cost where
tax revenue impacts are taken into account. Indirect effects of public provision (through labor
supply decisions and thus private consumption) are incorporated. The poverty-minimizing
public provision rule however replaces the welfare-weighted sum of MRS with the relative
marginal returns to deprivation reduction. Here the “MRS” term measures how well pub-
lic good is translated to reduced poverty (incorporating indirect effects as well), relative to
private consumption. Finally, when the public good has positive effects on productivity, its
provision can be desirable even if it would not have any direct impact on poverty.
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4 Commodity taxation with linear income taxes
4.1 Optimal commodity taxation with linear income tax under the welfarist
objective
This section considers the possibility that the government also uses commodity taxation (sub-
sidies) to influence consumers’ welfare. We follow the modeling of Diamond (1975). Unlike
the analysis above, there are J consumer goods xj instead of just two. Working with many
goods is used to be able to more clearly describe the conditions under which uniform com-
modity taxation occurs at the optimum. The government levies a tax tj on the consumption
of good xj , so that its consumer price is qj = pj + tj , where pj represents the producer price
(a commodity subsidy would be reflected by tj < 0). Let q denote the vector of all consumer
prices. In addition, the government can use a lump-sum transfer, b. Note that in this exposi-
tion, leisure is the untaxed numeraire commodity. Alternatively, one could also imply a linear
tax on labor supply as above and treat one of the consumption goods as untaxed numeraire.
However, choosing leisure as the numeraire makes the exposition easier. Thus, the consumer’s
budget constraint is ∑j qjxij = zi + b.
The government maximizes ∑iW (V i(b, q)) subject to its budget constraint ∑i∑j tjxij −
Nb = R. It is useful to define, following Diamond (1975),
γi = βi + λ
∑
j
tj
∂xij
∂b
(4.1)
as the net social marginal utility of income for person i. This notion takes into account the
direct marginal social gain, βi , and the tax revenue impact arising from commodity demand
changes. The rule for optimal commodity taxation for good k is shown to be
1
N
∑
i
∑
j
tj
∂x˜ik
∂qj
= 1
λ
cov(γi, xik). (4.2)
The left-hand side of the rule is the aggregate compensated change (weighted by com-
modity taxes) of good k when commodity prices are changed. The right-hand side refers to
the covariance of the net marginal social welfare of income and consumption of the good in
question. The rule says that the consumption of those goods whose demand is the greatest
for people with low net social marginal value of income (presumably, the rich) should be
discouraged by the tax system. Likewise the consumption of goods such as necessities should
be encouraged by the tax system.
The key policy question is whether or when uniform commodity taxes are optimal, or,
in other words, when would a linear income tax combined with an optimal demogrant be
sufficient to reach the society’s distributional goals at the smallest cost. Deaton (1979) shows
that weakly separable consumption and leisure and linear Engel curves are sufficient conditions
for the optimality of uniform commodity taxes. These requirements are quite stringent and
unlikely to hold in practice; however, the economic importance they imply is unclear. If
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implementing differentiated commodity taxation entails significant administrative costs, they
may easily outweigh the potential benefits of distributional goals, and that is why economists
have typically been quite skeptical about non-uniform commodity taxation when applied to
practical tax policy.
4.2 Optimal commodity taxation with linear income tax under poverty
minimization
Poverty could be measured in many ways when there are multiple commodities: the govern-
ment may care about overall consumption, the consumption of some of the goods (those that
are in the basket used to measure poverty) or then it cares about both the overall consump-
tion and the relative share of different kinds of consumption goods (such as merit goods). We
discuss these measurement issues in Appendix B, but here we examine the simplest set-up
where deprivation only depends on disposable income, ci = zi + b. Using the consumer’s
budget constraint, this is equal to the overall consumption level, ∑j qjxij .
The government thus minimizes the sum of the poverty index D
(∑
j qjx
i
j , c¯
)
, and the
budget constraint is the same as before. It is again useful to define
γiP = Dc
∑
j
qj
∂xij
∂b
+ λ
∑
j
tj
∂xij
∂b
(4.3)
as the net poverty impact of additional income for person i. This notion takes into account
the direct impact on poverty and the tax revenue impact arising from commodity demand
changes.
As shown in Appendix A.3, this leads to an optimal tax rule as below:
1
N
∑
i
∑
j
tj
∂x˜ik
∂qj
= − 1
λ
 1
N
∑
i
Dcx
i
k +
1
N
∑
i
∑
j
Dcqj
∂x˜ik
∂qj
+ 1
λ
cov
(
γiP , x
i
k
)
. (4.4)
In this formulation, the left-hand side is the same as in the welfarist case and it reflects the
aggregate compensated change in the demand of good k. The first two terms in the squared
brackets at the right-hand side capture the impacts of tax changes on poverty: the first term is
the direct impact of the price change (keeping consumption unaffected) on measured poverty,
whereas the second depends on the behavioral shift in consumption. Multiplied by the minus
sign, the former term implies that the consumption of the good should be encouraged, whereas
if demand decreases when the prices increase, the latter term actually serves to discourage
consumption. The last term on the right reflects the same principles as the covariance rule in
Equation (4.2), the correlation of the net poverty impact of income and the consumption of
the good in question. That is, the covariance part of the tax rule moves the tax rule in the
direction of favoring goods that have high poverty reduction impact on the poor (i.e. that
the poor consume more).
The key lesson to note from the optimal commodity tax rule in the poverty minimization
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case is that the conventional conditions for uniform commodity tax to be optimal are not valid
anymore. The reason is that even if demand was separable from labor supply, the first term at
the right still remains in the rule, and its magnitude clearly varies depending on the quantity
of good consumed. Thus, income transfers are not sufficient to alleviate poverty when the
government aims to minimize poverty that depends on disposable income. The intuition is very
simple: commodity tax changes have a direct effect on the purchasing power of the consumer
and these depend on the amount consumed. The extent of encouraging the consumption
of the goods is the greater the larger is their share of consumption among the consumption
bundles of the poor. The result resembles that of Pirttilä and Tuomala (2004), meaning that
the intuition from optimal nonlinear income taxation under poverty minimization carries over
to linear income taxation. A formal proof is provided in the Appendix.
In sum, the rule for optimal commodity taxation is changed when we shift from welfare
maximization to poverty minimization. The welfarist rule reflects a fairly straightforward
trade-off between efficiency (tax revenue) and equity (distributional impacts). The poverty-
minimizing commodity tax rule brings new terms, the interrelations of which are not easy to
disentangle. It however also takes into account efficiency considerations (tax revenue through
indirect labor supply effects) and equity (direct impact of the taxed good on poverty and
indirect impact via labor supply effects). Most importantly, the conventional wisdom of when
uniform commodity taxation is sufficient fails to hold in the poverty minimization case. Thus,
observed commodity subsidies in developing countries, such as fuel or food subsidies, can be
considered optimal given the preference for poverty minimization.11 In practice, it would be
wise to limit the number of differentiated commodity tax rates to a few essential categories
such as fuel and food, in order to keep the administrative complexity at a minimum.
5 Poverty minimization in the presence of an informal sector
An important issue for a developing country attempting to collect taxes is the issue of a large
informal sector. If part of tax revenue is lost due to tax evasion in the informal sector, which is
likely to be the case in the less developed economies, then the income transfer is reduced and
redistributive targets may not be met. In this section we discuss the implications of informality
for optimal redistributive policies for a government wishing to minimize poverty.12 The results
can thus be contrasted to those obtained in previous sections.
Following Kanbur (2015) and Kanbur and Keen (2014), informal operators can be catego-
rized as those who should comply with regulations but illegally choose not to, and those who
11Keen (2013) uses a tax reform approach and examines how much more effective transfers need to be than
differentiated commodity subsidies in reaching the poor to achieve the same poverty reduction with lower
government outlays.
12Such a society might also reflect poor administrative power and corruption in the tax collectiong authority.
Notice, however, that considering only the “leakage” of tax revenue in the model would only reduce the extent of
poverty reduction achieved with taxation by lowering the income transfer for everyone. The poverty-reduction
efficiency of taxation would thus be lowered, but there would be no differential effects across individuals.
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legally remain outside regulation e.g. due to the smaller size of operations (either naturally or
by adjusting size as a response to regulation). For our purposes, however, it is enough to lump
these categories into one ’informal sector’, where it is possible to avoid taxes at least to some
extent. It is also possible for workers to work in both sectors, such that part of total income
is declared for taxation and part is evaded (consider e.g. supplementing official employment
income with street vendoring). Note also that especially in the case of agriculture, evasion can
also consist of home production. In this case, the reason for “informality” would be the small
size of the producing entity, such that they are naturally not liable for taxes. Production
for own consumption is however still relevant for the wellbeing and measured poverty of the
family.
In this application, we follow the approach pioneered in Besley and Persson (2013). They
work with a model that fits into the description above, where part of the tax base evades taxes.
We thus take informality as given, and do not consider whether informality is ’natural’, illegal
or a response to taxation. Furthermore, this intensive margin model (what extent of income is
earned at informal sector), they argue, yields essentially similar results as an extensive margin
model (whether to participate in the formal job market).
Consider the case of income taxation. We can incorporate informality into the model
by noting that people can shelter part e of their labor income from taxation. The extent
of evasion is assumed to increase when the tax rate goes up, and thus ∂e∂a < 0. Income
taxes are only paid from income zi − ei. It is noteworthy that for a government wishing to
minimize income poverty, this is in fact beneficial: disposable incomes rise. The more this
effect is concentrated among the poor who enter the deprivation index, the better. Individual
consumption is now zi− τ(zi− ei) + b = ei+a(zi− ei) + b. On the other hand, tax collections
are reduced: the budget constraint becomes (1 − a)∑(zi − ei) = Nb + R. Our formulation
follows that of Besley and Persson (2013) but we simplify it in order to explicitly consider
the problem of optimal taxation, whereas they focus on the issue of investments in the state’s
fiscal capacity (we abstract from this issue here and take evasion as given).13 The framework
however nicely captures the essential tradeoffs a government faces when there is tax evasion.
The government now minimizes the Lagrangian L = ∑D (ei + a(zi − ei) + b, c¯)+ λ((1−
a)∑(zi − ei)−Nb−R). The first order condition with respect to the net-of-tax rate is:
∑
Dc
(
∂ei
∂a
+ zi − ei + a
(
∂zi
∂a
− ∂e
i
∂a
))
= λ
(∑
(zi − ei)− (1− a)
∑(∂zi
∂a
− ∂e
i
∂a
))
,
(5.1)
whereas, under the assumption that there are no income effects in evasion, the first order
condition with respect to b stays the same. From here, we can derive a rule for the optimal
13Another difference is that in their original formulation, people face costs of evasion. When the tax rate
goes up, the relative attractiveness of tax evasion increases, producing the same kind of effect
(
∂e
∂a
< 0
)
we
assume directly here for brevity. (These costs could be related to e.g. Allingham-Sandmo-type risk of being
caught and facing sanctions.) Also Slemrod’s (1990) review suggests that higher tax rates tend to increase the
supply of labor to the informal sector.
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tax following the same steps as in section 2.2:
τ∗
1− τ∗ =
1
εe
(
1− D˜
e
z¯e
)
(5.2)
where now εe is a tax elasticity of the net-of-evasion tax base z¯e = z¯− e¯ and D˜e represents the
relative impact of taxes and transfers on the deprivation index (see Appendix A for further
detail). The rule represents a tradeoff between poverty reduction and efficiency, both of which
are now altered by evasion. There is a pressure towards lower tax rates, as now distortions of
taxation are increased by evasion behavior, so εe > ε. Contrary to this effect, D˜e is reduced
compared to D˜ because reducing taxes (increasing a) is now a less useful instrument for
poverty reduction, as part of the taxes have been evaded. As ∂e∂a < 0, people pay more taxes
when tax rates are reduced, and therefore poverty in fact increases. D˜e thus works to increase
tax rates.
Therefore, an interesting tradeoff arises: informality increases the cost of raising taxes,
but it also means that higher taxes are less harmful as those in the informal sector do not need
to pay them (and they are still entitled to the lump-sum transfer).14 These countervailing
forces have not been noted by the literature before. The presence of informality therefore
seems to give rise to tax policy rules that are far from trivial. Future work could also look
more deeply into the issue of the tax mix in the presence of informality. If income tax is
more easily evaded than commodity taxation, as Boadway, Marchand, and Pestieau (1994)
suggest, this could give rise to policies that focus taxation and redistribution on commodity
taxes and subsidies, instead of income taxes and lump-sum transfers. Slemrod and Gillitzer
(2014) have also suggested focusing on a ’tax systems approach’ and including, among other
things, evasion behavior into optimal taxation analysis to obtain more useful prescriptions for
actual tax policy. This topic certainly deserves a more detailed analysis.
6 A numerical illustration
To further illustrate the differences of tax rates under poverty minimization and welfarism, we
provide a simple numerical simulation. Here we concentrate on the special case where there
are no income effects on labor supply and the elasticity of labor supply with respect to the
net-of-tax wage rate is constant. If ε denotes this elasticity, the quasi-linear indirect utility
function is given by v(w(1− τ), b) = b+ [w(1−τ)]1+ε1+ε , so that ε is constant. Like most work on
optimal non-linear and linear income taxation, we use the lognormal distribution ln(n,mσ2)
to describe the distribution of productivities with support [0,∞) and parameters m and σ
(see Aitchison and Brown 1957). The first parameter, m, is the log of the median wage. The
second parameter, the variance of log wage σ2, is itself an inequality measure. As is well
known, the lognormal distribution fits reasonably well over a large part of income range but
14The idea that those in the informal sector can still receive transfers matches well with reality: many of the
cash transfer systems reach those with little or no connection to the formal sector.
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diverges markedly at both tails. The Pareto distribution in turn fits well at the upper tail.
We also use the two-parameter version of the Champernowne distribution (known also as the
Fisk-distribution). This distribution approaches asymptotically a form of Pareto distribution
for large values of wages but it also has an interior maximum. In our simulations, the revenue
requirement is set to zero, thus the system is purely redistributive.
To illustrate the poverty-minimizing tax formula in (2.3), we also need to specify a measure
of poverty. Typically, poverty indices consist of computing some average measure of depri-
vation by setting individual needs as defined above at the agreed upon poverty line c¯. For
this purpose we take a poverty index of the form developed by Foster, Greer and Thorbecke
(1984). They have proposed defining a poverty index as the average of these poverty gaps
across individuals raised to some power α. When α = 1, it is just the proportion of units
below the poverty line multiplied by the average poverty gap. (See Appendix B for more
details.) We consider the cases where either 30 or 40 per cent of the population lie below the
poverty line.
The results from the simulation of the optimal tax when the government minimizes the
poverty gap for the lognormal case are presented in Table 6.1. Results are shown for two
different values of labor supply elasticity ε, two different values regarding income dispersion
σ, and two values of the share of population below the poverty line F (w¯). The tax rates are
high, above 60 per cent, for all the combinations of parameter values.15
Comparing these results to the welfarist case is not straightforward, as those depend on
the chosen welfare function. We adopt a constant relative inequality aversion form of the
welfare function: the contribution to social welfare of the ith individual is w
1−η
i
1−η , where η is
the constant relative inequality aversion coefficient. Hence the social marginal value of income
to an individual with wage rate w is proportional to w−η. Using the property of the lognormal
distribution ln(E(ws)) = sm+ s2 σ22 , we can calculate the optimal tax rate from the following
formula: τ1−τ =
1
ε [1 − e−η(1+ε)σ
2 ]. Or, using the property of the lognormal distribution that
ln(1 + cv2) = σ2, where cv is the coefficient of variation, we can rewrite τ = 11+ε/[1+cv2]−η(1+ε) .
A wide range of values for the inequality aversion parameter η have been employed in
the literature, varying typically from 0.5 to 2. Note that, as discussed in Section 2.1, as
η →∞, social preferences approach ’maximin’ preferences, where the optimal tax rate is the
same as the revenue-maximizing tax rate, τ = 11+ε , which does not depend on the original
income distribution. Naturally, if there is no regard for inequality in the society, η = 0 and
τ = 0. Table 6.2 displays the welfaristic tax simulation results for two different values of labor
supply elasticity ε, for two different values of income dispersion σ, and for five different values
of inequality aversion η.
The simulation results illustrate clearly that at conventional inequality aversion levels,
optimal welfaristic tax rates lie well below the poverty-minimizing rates. Only as inequality
15The results are very similar using the Champernowne distribution (with income dispersion parameters
chosen so that inequality is similar in both cases), which is not very surprising as the distributions only differ
at the top of the income schedule. These results are available upon request.
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σ = 0.7 σ = 1.0
ε F (w¯) = 0.3 F (w¯) = 0.4 F (w¯) = 0.3 F (w¯) = 0.4
0.25 79 77 79 78
0.5 65 63 66 64
Table 6.1: Simulated tax rates for poverty minimization under different values of ε, σ, and
F (w¯).
σ = 0.7
ε η = 0.5 η = 1 η = 2 η →∞
0.25 43 58 69 80
0.5 31 44 56 67
σ = 1.0
ε η = 0.5 η = 1 η = 2 η →∞
0.25 52 65 74 80
0.5 38 51 61 67
Table 6.2: Simulated tax rates in the welfaristic case under different values of ε, σ, and η.
aversion becomes extremely high do the welfaristic rates approach the poverty-minimizing
ones. With poverty minimization as the social objective, optimal tax rates are close to the
revenue-maximizing ’maximin’ rate.
Another point of comparison could be the welfaristic linear tax simulations of Stern (1976).
His calculations differ from ours as he incorporates income effects and a non-constant elasticity
of labor supply with respect to the tax rate.16 With the elasticity of substitution between
consumption and leisure at 0.5 and income dispersion described by σ = 0.39, as concern for
inequality rises from low to medium and high, he finds tax rates rising from 19 per cent to
43 and 48 per cent. The extreme ’maximin’ result is 80 per cent. These tax rates are also
clearly lower than the poverty-minimizing rates, except at very extreme values of inequality
aversion.
These numerical examples and Stern’s (1976) results tend to suggest that the tax rates for
the poverty minimization case are likely to be higher than for many welfarist examples. The
results compare to Kanbur, Keen, and Tuomala (1994), who also found that the (non-linear)
marginal tax rates on the poor are fairly high under the poverty minimization objective.
Both their and our results are interesting from the point of view that the analytical formulae
for the optimal tax rate include a term that, ceteris paribus, encourages labor supply, but
in computational results its influence is offset, most likely, by the need to minimimize the
poverty gap. The higher the poverty rate, the higher the lump-sum grant financed by these
taxes needs to be, in order to raise more people out of poverty.
16Our simplifying assumptions allow us to provide tax rates with respect to the three parameters in Table
6.2.
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7 Conclusion
This paper examined optimal linear income taxation, public provision of public and private
goods and the optimal combination of linear income tax and commodity taxes when the
government’s aim is to minimize poverty. The linear tax environment was chosen because
such taxes are more easily implementable in a developing country context and since optimal
linear tax rules are seen to provide similar intuition as the more complex non-linear tax
formulas.
The results show that the linear income tax includes additional components that work
towards lowering the marginal tax rate. This result arises from the goal to boost earnings to
reduce income poverty. Unlike in the optimal non-linear income tax framework, this lower
marginal tax affects all taxpayers in the society. However, the numerical simulations offered
suggest that this mechanims is offset by the distributive concerns and in practice the optimal
tax rates for poverty minimization appear high. Public good provision in the optimal tax
framework under poverty minimization was shown to depend on the relative efficiency of
public provision versus income transfers in generating poverty reductions. One particular
avenue where public provision is useful is via its potentially beneficial impact on individuals’
earnings capacity. Thus, public provision can be desirable even if its direct welfare effects
were non-existent.
Perhaps more importantly, poverty minimization as an objective changes completely the
conditions under which uniform commodity taxation is optimal. When the government’s
objective is to minimize poverty that depends on disposable income, uniform commodity tax-
ation is unlikely to be ever optimal: this is because the commodity tax changes have first-order
effects on consumers’ budget via the direct impact on the cost of living, and this direct ef-
fect depends on the relative importance of different goods in the overall consumption bundle.
Separability in demand coupled with linear Engel curves is not sufficient to guarantee opti-
mality of uniform commodity taxes. In reality, the administrative difficulties of implementing
commodity taxation with many tax rates must, of course, be taken into account, as well.
We also examined the implications of the presence of an informal sector for optimal tax-
and-transfer policies. The results revealed that when the government is concerned about
income poverty, the presence of the informal sector is, on the one hand, useful, as it reduces
the poverty-increasing effect of higher taxes but, on the other hand, it is also costly since it is
likely to increase the elasticity of the tax base. Examining the implications of informality on
the role of other instruments of government policies is an important avenue for future work.
Another strand of follow-up work should address the question on complimentary policies
for redistribution, such as minimum wages. It should be borne in mind that different policies
impose different requirements on administrative capacity,17 and examining which poverty
17For example, Lee and Saez (2012) show how a minimum wage policy can usefully complement an optimal
nonlinear income tax and transfer policy under welfarist objectives. However, imposing minimum wage regu-
lation implies that the government needs to be either able to observe individual wage rates, or has sufficient
institutional strength to rely on whistleblowers to denounce non-complying employers, in order to enforce the
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reduction instruments become available only as the societies advance on their development
path is an interesting avenue for further work.
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A Mathematical appendix
A.1 Linear income taxation
A.1.1 Welfarism
Consider first the welfarist case. Using λ to denote the multiplier associated with the budget
constraint, the government’s Lagrangian is L = ∑W (V i(a, b)) + λ ((1− a)∑ zi −Nb−R).
The social marginal utility of income is βi = WV V ib . Using Roy’s theorem, V ia = V ib zi, we
have WV V ia = βizi. The first order conditions with respect to a and b, respectively, are then:
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∑
βizi = λ
(∑
zi − (1− a)
∑
zia
)
(A.1)∑
βi = λ
(
N − (1− a)
∑
zib
)
. (A.2)
Divide (A.1) by (A.2) to get: ∑
βizi∑
βi
=
∑
zi − (1− a)∑ zia
N − (1− a)∑ zib (A.3)
Denote average income z¯ =
∑
zi
N and welfare-weighted average income z(β) =
∑
βizi∑
βi
to get:
z(β) = z¯ − (1− a)z¯a1− (1− a)z¯b (A.4)
Multiply the government’s revenue constraint by 1N and define g =
R
N to get (1− a)z¯− b = g,
and totally differentiate, keeping g constant:
db
da
|gconst = z¯ − (1− a)z¯a−1 + (1− a)z¯b = −z(β) (A.5)
The fact that z(β) = − dbda |gconst tells us that welfare-weighted labor supply should be equal
to the constant-revenue effect of tax rate changes in b.
By totally differentiating average labor income z¯ and using (A.5), we have
dz¯
da
|gconst = z¯a + z¯b db
da
|gconst = z¯a − z¯bz(β) (A.6)
When we impose g as a constant we have to give up one of our degrees of freedom. Now
the interpretation of dz¯da |gconst is then the effect on labor supply when a is changed, as is b, in
order to keep tax revenue constant. Using (A.6) we can write (A.4):
z(β)− z¯ = (1− a)dz¯
da
|gconst = −τ dz¯(1− τ)z¯
d(1− τ)(1− τ)z¯ (A.7)
from which we get the optimal tax rate of equation (2.1).
We now derive the results in the form of the Piketty and Saez (2013) model. In their model,
there is a continuum of individuals, whose distribution is ν(i) (population size is normalized to
one). Individuals maximize their utility ui((1− τ)zi + b, zi), and their FOC implicitly defines
the Marshallian earnings function ziu(1− τ, b). Using this, aggregate earnings are Zu(1− τ, b).
The government’s budget constraint b+R = τZu(1− τ, b) implicitly defines b as a function of
τ , and consequently Zu can also be defined solely as a function of τ : Z(1−τ) = Zu(1−τ, b(τ)).
Z has elasticity ε = 1−τZ
dZ
d(1−τ) .
To start, note that if the government only cared about maximizing tax revenue τZ(1− τ),
it would set τ such that ∂(τZ(1−τ))∂τ = 0: Z(1− τ)− τ dZd(1−τ) = 0. Using τZ dZd(1−τ) = τ1−τ ε, this
gives
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τ∗
1− τ∗ =
1
ε
⇔ τ∗ = 11 + ε (A.8)
When the government is concerned about social welfare, its problem is to max SWF =´
ωiW (ui((1 − τ)zi + τZ(1 − τ) − R, zi)) dν(i), where use has been made of the individual
consumption ci = (1− τ)zi + b = (1− τ)zi + τZ(1− τ)− R. Here ω is a Pareto weight and
W is an increasing and concave transformation of utilities. The FOC ∂SWF∂τ = 0 is:
ˆ
ωiWu
[
uic
(
−zi + (1− τ)∂z
i
∂τ
+ Z + τ dZ
dτ
)
+ uiz
∂zi
∂τ
]
dν(i) = 0
which, using the individual’s envelope condition, becomes:
ˆ
ωiWuu
i
c
(
−zi + Z − τ dZ
d(1− τ)
)
dν(i) = 0
Taking Z − τ dZd(1−τ) out of the integrand and leaving it to the left-hand side we have on
the right-hand side
´
ωiWuuicz
i dν(i)´
ωiWuuic dν(i)
. Piketty and Saez define βi = ω
iWuuic´
ωiWuuicdν(i)
as a normalized
social marginal welfare weight for individual i, so that the term can be simplified to:
Z − τ dZ
d(1− τ) =
ˆ
βizi dν(i)
Using the definition of aggregate elasticity of earnings and defining β¯ =
´
βizidν(i)
Z as the
average normalized social marginal welfare weight, weighted by labor incomes zi (it can also
be interpreted as the ratio of the average income weighted by individual welfare weights βi to
the average income Z), we can rewrite this as:
1− τ1− τ ε = β¯
According to Piketty and Saez, β¯ “measures where social welfare weights are concentrated
on average over the distribution of earnings”. The social welfare maximizing tax rate thus
gives the optimality rule of equation (A.9) in the main text.As mentioned above, Piketty and
Saez (2013) offer another useful, alternative formulation of the optimal income tax rule in the
welfarist case. They work with a continuous population of measure one, and a social welfare
function of the type
´
ωiW (ui) dν(i), where ω is a Pareto weight and W is an increasing
and concave transformation of utilities. They define βi = ω
iWuuic´
ωiWuuicdν(i)
as a normalized social
marginal welfare weight for individual i and β¯ =
´
βizidν(i)
Z as the average normalized social
marginal welfare weight, weighted by labor incomes zi (it can also be interpreted as the ratio
of the average income weighted by individual welfare weights βi to the average income Z).
The elasticity of Z with respect to 1− τ is denoted by ε. Using this notation, we arrive at a
similar social welfare-maximizing tax rate as in Piketty and Saez:
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τ∗
1− τ∗ =
1
ε
(
1− β¯
)
. (A.9)
The welfare-maximizing tax rate is thus decreasing in both the average marginal welfare
weight and the tax elasticity of aggregate earnings. A higher β¯ reflects a lower taste for
redistribution, and thus a lower desire to tax for redistributive reasons.
Piketty and Saez also note that (A.9) can be written in the form of τ∗ =
−cov
(
βi, z
i
Z
)
−cov
(
βi, z
i
Z
)
+ε
. If
higher incomes are valued less (lower β) then the covariances are negative and the tax rate is
positive. This is a similar formulation as in Dixit and Sandmo (1977), equation (20), where
τ∗ = − 1λ
−cov(zi,µi)
∂z¯
∂(1−τ) |comp.
(here λ represents the government’s budget constraint Lagrange multiplier
and µi the individual’s marginal utility of income, s.t. uc = µi). Here the numerator reflects
the equity element and the denominator the efficiency component, similar as in (A.9).
A.1.2 Non-welfarism
In the non-welfarist case, the Lagrangean function is L = ∑F (azi + b, zi)+ λ((1− a)∑ zi−
Nb−R). The first-order conditions with respect to a and b are:
∑(
Fc(zi + azia) + Fzzia
)
= λ
(∑
zi − (1− a)
∑
zia
)
(A.10)∑(
Fc(1 + azib) + Fzzib
)
= λ
(
N − (1− a)
∑
zib
)
(A.11)
Dividing the first equation with the second and dividing through the right hand side with N
we get: ∑(
Fc(zi + azia) + Fzzia
)∑ (
Fc(1 + azib) + Fzzib
) = z¯ − (1− a)z¯a1− (1− a)z¯b , (A.12)
which gives equation (2.3). Minimizing a deprivation index D is a special case of this, such
that Fc = Dc and Fz = 0. Otherwise the derivation of (2.5) is analogous to the above.
Let us next derive the poverty minimizing tax rule following the formulation of Piketty
and Saez. Given the government’s instruments, consumption is ci = (1 − τ)zi + b = (1 −
τ)zi + τZ(1− τ)−R. The poverty-minimization objective in the continuous case thus reads:
min P =
ˆ
D
(
ci, c¯
)
dν(i)
=
ˆ
D
(
(1− τ)zi + τZ(1− τ)−R, c¯
)
dν(i) (A.13)
The optimal tax rate is found from the government’s FOC, ∂P∂τ = 0:
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ˆ
Dc
(
−zi + (1− τ)∂z
i
∂τ
+ Z + τ dZ
dτ
)
dν(i) = 0
⇔
ˆ
Dc
(
−zi − (1− τ) ∂z
i
∂(1− τ) + Z − τ
dZ
d(1− τ)
)
dν(i) = 0 (A.14)
Define a “normalized marginal deprivation weight” as βi = Dc´
Dcdν(j) . Using this definition,(
Z − τ dZd(1−τ)
) ´
Dc dν(i) =
´
Dc
(
zi + (1− τ) ∂zi∂(1−τ)
)
dν(i) can be written as:
Z − τ dZ
d(1− τ) =
ˆ
βi
(
zi + (1− τ) ∂z
i
∂(1− τ)
)
dν(i) (A.15)
Using the definition of the elasticity of individual labor earnings εi = 1−τ
zi
∂zi
∂(1−τ) , we have
(1 − τ) ∂zi∂(1−τ) = ziεi and using elasticity of aggregate earnings ε = 1−τZ dZd(1−τ) we have Z −
τ dZd(1−τ) = 1− τ1−τ ε and we can rewrite the above as:
Z
(
1− τ1− τ ε
)
=
ˆ
βi
(
zi + ziεi
)
dν(i) (A.16)
Which leads to the poverty minimizing rule of
τ∗
1− τ∗ =
1
ε
(
1− β¯ − β¯ε
)
, (A.17)
where analogously to Piketty-Saez, β¯ =
´
βizidν(i)
Z
(
=
´
Dczidν(i)
Z
´
Dcdν(j)
)
is an average normalized de-
privation weight, weighted by labor incomes (or, analogously, average labor income weighted
by individual deprivation weights). In addition we have defined β¯ε =
´
βiziεidν(i)
Z
(
=
´
Dcziεidν(i)
Z
´
Dcdν(j)
)
,
which describes average labor incomes weighted by their corresponding individual elasticities
and deprivation weights. This can be interpreted as a combined deprivation and efficiency
effect.
As in the welfarist setting, the more elastic average earnings are to taxation, the lower is
the optimal tax rate (a regular efficiency effect). The optimal poverty-minimizing tax rate is
decreasing in the average deprivation weight β¯, as a higher taste for redistribution towards
the materially deprived implies a lower β¯ and thus higher taxation for redistributive purposes.
The effect is analogous to the welfarist tax rate, of course with slightly different definitions
for β¯.
The new term β¯ε can be interpreted as a combined deprivation weight and efficiency
effect. The elasticity term implicit in β¯ε takes into account the incentive effects of taxation on
working and works to reduce τ∗. To avoid discouraging the poor from working, their tax rates
should be lower. But because the tax instrument is forced to be linear, tax rates are then
lowered for everyone, as we found in the Tuomala model in equation (2.5). The value of β¯ε
depends on the relationship of the individual earnings elasticities and income: if the elasticity
is the same across income levels, there is just a level effect moving from β¯ to β¯ε; however if
the elasticity were higher for more deprived individuals, for example, β¯ε would most likely
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be higher than under a flat elasticity. This works towards a lower tax rate in order to avoid
discouraging the poorest from working. However, whether β¯ε is high or low does not depend
only on the shape of the elasticity but also on the shape of the deprivation weights, which
also affect β¯.
Finally, the third way for expressing the optimal tax rule in the case of poverty mini-
mization is one following the Dixit and Sandmo (1977) formulation and it can be written
as
τ∗ = − 1
λ
cov
(
Dc, z
i
)
+ 1N
∑
Dcaz˜
i
a + cov
(
Dcaz
i
b, z
i
)
1
N
∑
z˜ia
. (A.18)
In this expression, the denominator is the same as in equation (20) of Dixit and Sandmo
(1977) presented in section A.1, that is, the average derivative of compensated labor supply
with respect to the net-of-tax rate. In the numerator, the first term measures the strength
of the association between income and poverty impact: when the association between overall
poverty and small income is strong (this would the case of squared poverty gap), the tax
should be high so that it will finance a sizable lump-sum transfer. If the association is weaker
(as in the headcount rate), the tax rate is optimally smaller. The second and the third terms
in the numerator are new. They measure the indirect effects from changes in the tax rate
on labor supply. Here z˜ is the compensated (Hicksian) labor supply. The greater is the
reduction in the labor supply following an increase in the tax rate (it is the compensated
change as the tax increase is linked with a simultaneous increase in the lump-sum transfer),
the smaller should the tax rate be in order to avoid increases in deprivation arising from lower
earned income. The last two terms in the numerator are closely linked with a formulation
Dc(1− τ)∂z∂q |comp, where the idea is that the last covariance term serves as a corrective device
for the mean impact of taxes on labor supply (similarly as in the denominator in the original
Dixit-Sandmo formulation).
A.2 Public good provision
A.2.1 Welfarism
The Lagrangian is L = ∑W (V i(a, b,G)) + λ ((1− a)∑ zi −Nb−NpiG−R). Maximizing
the Lagrangean with respect to b and G gives:
∑
βi = λ
(
N − (1− a)
∑
zib
)
(A.19)∑
WV V
i
G = λ
(
Npi − (1− a)
∑
ziG
)
(A.20)
Dividing (A.20) by (A.19) we obtain∑
βiσi∑
βi
= pi − (1− a)z¯G1− (1− a)z¯b , (A.21)
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where we define σ∗ =
∑
βiσi∑
βi
to be the welfare weighted average marginal rate of substitution
between public good and income for individual i. Rewriting this rule gives equation (3.1) in
the main text.
Extending the Piketty and Saez approach to include public provision, the government’s
goal function is
SWF =
ˆ
ωiW
(
ui
(
(1− τ) zi + τZ((1− τ), G)−R− piG,G, zi
))
dν(i).
The FOC for τ is as before, and the FOC for public good provision G is
ˆ
ωiWu
(
uiG + uix
(
(1− τ)∂z
i
∂G
+ τ dZ
dG
− pi
))
dν(i) = 0,
which produces the following public good provision rule:
´
ωiWu
(
uiG + uix(1− τ)∂z
i
∂G
)
dν(i)´
ωiWuuix dν(i)
= pi − τ dZ
dG
. (A.22)
The left-hand side relates the welfare gains of public good provision (a direct (uG) and indirect
effect (ux(1 − τ)∂zi∂G via labor supply reactions)) to the welfare gains of directly increasing
consumption (cash transfers) and the right-hand side relates the costs of providing the public
good (both its price and the effect it has on tax revenue) to the costs of directly increasing
consumption (equal to 1 in this model).18
A.2.2 Poverty minimization
Using Tuomala’s model, and the deprivation index D
(
x,G, x¯, G¯
)
defined over consumption
of the public good G and other private consumption x, we can divide the government’s first
order condition for G (analogous to Equation (A.20)) with that of b (analogous to Equation
(A.19)) to get the following relationship:
D∗ = pi − (1− a)z¯G1− (1− a)z¯b (A.23)
where D∗ =
∑
DG+
∑
DxaziG∑
Dx(1+azib)
. This can be rewritten to get equation (3.2).
In the Piketty-Saez type of model, individual private consumption is x = (1− τ)zi + b =
(1− τ)zi + τZ((1− τ), G)−R− piG. The government’s problem is then:
min P =
ˆ
D
(
xi, G, x¯, G¯
)
dν(i)
=
ˆ
D
(
(1− τ)zi + τZ((1− τ), G)−R− piG,G, x¯, G¯
)
dν(i) (A.24)
18In equation (A.22), we could define a normalized marginal social welfare weight, similar as before, βi =
ωiWuu
i
x´
ωiWuu
i
xdν(i)
to get
´
ωiWuu
i
G dν(i)´
ωiWuu
i
x dν(i)
+
´
βi(1− τ) ∂zi
∂G
dν(i) = pi − τ dZ
dG
.
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The first-order condition for optimal tax τ is unchanged, and the FOC for public good provi-
sion is
´ [
DG +Dx
(
(1− τ)∂zi∂G + τ dZdG − pi
)]
dν(i) = 0, which gives the public provision rule
of (3.4).
The poverty minimization problem in the case of provision of a quasi-private good is
min P =
ˆ
D
(
xi, si, x¯, s¯
)
dν(i)
=
ˆ
D
(
(1− τ)zi + τZ((1− τ), G)−R− piG− phi, si, x¯, s¯
)
dν(i) (A.25)
The FOC for public good provisionG is
´ [
Dx
(
(1− τ)∂zi∂s ∂s∂G + τ dZdG − pi − p∂h
i
∂G
)
+Ds ∂s
i
∂G
]
dν(i) =
0, which gives the public provision rule (3.5).
A.3 Commodity taxation
A.3.1 Welfarism
Lagrangean of the government’s optimization problem is the following:
L =
∑
i
W
(
V i(b, q)
)
+ λ
∑
i
∑
j
tjx
i
j −Nb−R
 (A.26)
The first-order conditions with respect to b and qk are:
∑
i
βi + λ
∑
i
∑
j
tj
∂xij
∂b
− λN = 0 (A.27)
−
∑
i
βixik + λ
∑
i
∑
j
tj
∂xij
∂qk
+ λ
∑
i
xik = 0 (A.28)
where Roy’s identity has been used in (A.28), i.e. ∂V i∂qk = −∂V
i
∂b x
i
k. Using the definition of
γi, this means that (A.27) can we rewritten as∑
i γ
i
N
= λ, (A.29)
implying that the average net social marginal utility of income must equal the shadow price
of budget revenues at the optimum. Next use the definition of γi and the Slutsky equation
for the commodity demand
∂xij
∂qk
=
∂x˜ij
∂qk
− xik
∂xij
∂b
where x˜ij denotes the compensated (Hicksian) demand for good xij , in (A.28), to get
∑
i
∑
j
tj
∂x˜ij
∂qk
= 1
λ
∑(
γi − λ
)
xik. (A.30)
The covariance between γi and the demand of the good xk can be written as (using (A.29))
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cov
(
γi, xik
)
=
∑
i γ
ixik
N
−
∑
i γ
i
N
∑
i x
i
k
N
=
∑
i γ
ixik
N
− λ
∑
i x
i
k
N
.
Using Slutsky symmetry, equation (A.30) can therefore be written as a covariance rule
(4.2).
A.3.2 Poverty minimization
The deprivation index to be minimized is D
(∑
j qjx
i
j , c¯
)
. The first-order conditions with
respect to b and qk are:
∑
i
Dc
∑
j
qj
∂xij
∂b
+ λ
∑
i
∑
j
tj
∂xij
∂b
− λN = 0 (A.31)
∑
i
Dcx
i
k +
∑
i
Dc
∑
j
qj
∂xij
∂qk
+ λ
∑
i
∑
j
tj
∂xij
∂qk
+ λ
∑
i
xik = 0 (A.32)
Using the Slutsky equation in equation (A.32) and dividing by N leads to
1
N
∑
i
Dcx
i
k +
1
N
∑
i
Dc
∑
j
qj
(
∂x˜ij
∂qk
− xik
∂xij
∂b
)
+ λ
N
∑
i
∑
j
tj
(
∂x˜ij
∂qk
− xik
∂xij
∂b
)
+ λ
N
∑
i
xik = 0 (A.33)
Multiplying equation (A.31) by
∑
i
xik/N2 and adding it with equation (A.33) gives
1
N
∑
i
Dcx
i
k +
1
N
∑
i
Dc
∑
j
qj
∂x˜ij
∂qk
− 1
N
∑
i
∑
j
Dcqjx
i
k
∂xij
∂b
+ 1
N
∑
iDc
N
∑
j
qj
∂xij
∂b
∑
i
xik +
λ
N
∑
i
∑
j
tj
∂x˜ij
∂qk
− λ
N
∑
i
∑
j
tjx
i
k
∂xij
∂b
+ 1
N
λ
N
∑
i
∑
j
tj
∂xij
∂b
∑
i
xik = 0 (A.34)
Noticing that the covariance γiP and xik can be written as 1N
∑
i
∑
j Dcqjx
i
k
∂xij
∂b +
λ
N
∑
i
∑
j tjx
i
k
∂xij
∂b −
1
N
∑
i
Dc
N
∑
j qj
∂xij
∂b
∑
i x
i
k − 1N λN
∑
i
∑
j tj
∂xij
∂b
∑
i x
i
k, the rule above can be written as equation
(4.4) in the main text.
A.3.3 Non-optimality of uniform commodity taxation
We demonstrate formally how uniform commodity taxation is not optimal in the case of
poverty minimization. To see this, rewrite first the FOC with respect to b (A.31) as
1− 1N
∑
i
∑
j tj
∂xij
∂b
1
N
∑
iDc
∑
j qj
∂xij
∂b
= 1
λ
. (A.35)
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Next, rewriting the FOC for qk (equation (A.33)) yields
1
N
∑
i
∑
j
tj
∂x˜ik
∂qj
=− 1
λ
1
N
∑
i
Dcx
i
k −
1
λ
1
N
∑
i
Dc
∑
j
qj
∂x˜ik
∂qj
+ 1
λ
1
N
∑
i
Dc
∑
j
qj
∂xij
∂b
xik +
1
N
∑
i
∑
j
tj
∂xij
∂b
− 1
xik. (A.36)
Here we can substitute for 1λ from (A.35) in the first term at the lower row of equation
(A.36). Following Deaton (1979, p. 359-360), when preferences are separable and Engel curves
are linear, demand is written as xij = δij(q) + θj(q)ci, hence the derivative of demand with
respect to disposable income c or transfer b is θj(q), i.e. independent of the person i. By
writing out explicitly the solution that the derivative of demand w.r.t b is independent of i
and write ∂x
i
j
∂b = θj(q) we have:
1
N
∑
i
∑
j
tj
∂x˜k
i
∂qj
=− 1
λ
1
N
∑
i
Dcx
i
k −
1
λ
1
N
∑
i
Dc
∑
j
qj
∂x˜k
i
∂qj
+
1− 1N
∑
i
∑
j tjθj(q)∑
iDc
(∑
j qjθj(q)
) ∑
i
Dcx
i
k
∑
j
qjθj(q)

+ 1
N
∑
i
xik
∑
j
tjθj(q)− 1
 (A.37)
where in the second row we can cancel out the ∑j qjθj(q) terms and rewrite ∑i∑j tjθj(q) =
N
∑
j tjθj(q) in the numerator because the term is independent over i:
1
N
∑
i
∑
j
tj
∂x˜k
i
∂qj
=− 1
λ
1
N
∑
i
Dcx
i
k −
1
λ
1
N
∑
i
Dc
∑
j
qj
∂x˜k
i
∂qj
+
1−∑j tjθj(q)∑
iDc
∑
i
Dcx
i
k +
1
N
∑
i
xik
∑
j
tjθj(q)− 1
 (A.38)
Note next that due to homogeneity of degree 0 of compensated demand, ∑j qj ∂x˜ki∂qj +
wi
∂x˜k
i
∂wi
= 0. This, together with the observation that if a uniform commodity tax t was a
solution to a problem at hand, this would mean that the left-hand side of (A.36) could be
written as − tN
∑
iwi
∂x˜k
i
∂w . Because of separability, the substitution response is linked to the
full income derivative, so that ∂x˜ki∂w =φiθj(q). Because of these arguments, (A.36) becomes
− t
N
θj(q)
∑
i
wiφ
i = − 1
λ
1
N
∑
i
Dcx
i
k −
1
λ
1
N
θj(q)
∑
i
Dcwiφ
i
+
1− t∑j θj(q)∑
iDc
∑
i
Dcx
i
k +
1
N
∑
i
xik
t∑
j
θj(q)− 1
 . (A.39)
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Note that terms incorporation θj(q) cannot be canceled out from the equation so the result
remains dependent on j. In addition, even if the terms were canceled, the term ∑iDc xikN still
depends on j. This shows that uniform commodity taxation is not optimal when the objective
function of the government is to minimize poverty.
A.4 Optimal income taxation with an informal sector
A.4.1 Welfarism
The welfarist Lagrangian, in the presence of informality, is L = ∑W (V i(a, b, e))+ λ((1− a)∑(zi − ei) − Nb − R). We can denote the effective tax base as ze = z − e. The derivative
of this tax base with respect to tax rate a is denoted zea = za − ∂e∂a , where we assume ∂e∂a < 0
(whereas ∂e∂b = 0). The first-order conditions with respect to a and b are:∑
WV V
e
a = λ
(∑
ze − (1− a)
∑
zea
)
∑
WV Vb = λ
(
N − (1− a)
∑
zb
)
,
where V ea is a shorthand for the derivative of the indirect utility function that takes individual
evasion behavior into account. Should there be no evasion, the individual would maximize
her utility over income az + b and Va = λz. Under evasion, consumption is a(z − e) + e + b
and, by the envelope theorem, V ea = λ(z − e) = λze. Roy’s theorem adapts in this case to:
V ea = Vbze, and welfare-weighted average income can be denoted as ze(β) =
∑
βize,i∑
β
. The
ratio of the first-order conditions is:
ze(β) = z¯
e − (1− a)z¯ea
1− (1− a)z¯b ,
and we can derive the optimal tax rate by following the same steps as in Section A.1, by
considering the evasion-modified tax base ze instead of z:
τ∗
1− τ∗ =
1
εe
(
1− z
e(β)
z¯e
)
.
The intuition behind the derivation and the tax rule is the same as before, but we must
consider the relevant tax base in the context of evasion. Both the elasticity of labor income
with respect to the tax rate and the relevant welfare concepts change when part of the income
base evades taxation.
A.4.2 Poverty minimization
The derivation of Equation (5.2) follows the same steps as presented above and in part A.1.2.
The first-order conditions with respect to a and b are:
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∑
Dc
(
∂ei
∂a
+ ze + azea
)
= λ
(∑
ze − (1− a)
∑
zea
)
∑
Dc(1 + azib) = λ
(
N − (1− a)
∑
zib
)
From the ratio of the two conditions we get the measure of relative deprivation impact under
tax evasion, D˜e:
D˜e ≡
∑
Dc
(
ze + azea + ∂e∂a
)
Dc(1 + azib)
= z¯
e − (1− a)z¯ea
1− (1− a)z¯b
which gives us Equation (5.2) in the text. D˜e measures the relative efficiency of taxes and
transfers. The latter impact (the denominator) is the same as before, but the impact of
taxation (numerator) is different in the presence of tax evasion.
B Measuring poverty
One of the most popular poverty measures is the Pα category developed by Foster, Greer
and Thorbecke. It is usually written in the form of Pα =
´ z
0
(
z−y
z
)α
f(y) d(y) where z is the
poverty line and y is income. Defining the poverty index in terms of disposable income (as
in Kanbur and Keen (1989) for example), the measure becomes: Pα =
´ c¯
0
(
c¯−ci
c¯
)α
dν(i). ci is
disposable income, which is defined in the Piketty-Saez model of section 2 as ci = (1−τ)zi+b =
(1− τ)zi + τZ(1− τ)−R. We can use this specification of the functional form of deprivation
to define the derivative Dc = −αc¯
(
c¯−ci
c¯
)α−1
(note that Dc < 0 as long as ci < c¯). We can
follow the same steps to arrive at the optimal tax rate τ∗ = 1−β¯−β¯ε1−β¯−β¯ε+ε where now
βi = Dc´ c¯
0 Dc dν(i)
=
−αc¯
(
c¯−ci
c¯
)α−1
´ c¯
0 −αc¯
(
c¯−ci
c¯
)α−1
dν(i)
=
(
c¯−ci
c¯
)α−1
´ c¯
0
(
c¯−ci
c¯
)α−1
dν(i)
and consequently β¯ =
´ c¯
0 β
izi dν(i)
Z and β¯ε =
´ c¯
0 β
iziεi dν(i)
Z , as before. Everything else stays
exactly the same as in the calculations of section 2.2.1. Also in the case of Tuomala’s and Dixit
and Sandmo’s models, the results stay the same, and we can plug in the explicit definition for
Dc, the derivative of the poverty measure with respect to disposable income, into the results.
B.1 Poverty measurement in the context of public good provision
Employing the FGT poverty measure in the context of public good provision for poverty re-
duction is more complicated than in the case of just disposable income. In section 3.2 the
government’s objective function was defined as min P =
´
D
(
xi, G, x¯, G¯
)
dν(i), that is, de-
privation was measured both as deprivation in private consumption (i.e. disposable income)
as well as with respect to the public good. But the FGT index is a uni-dimensional mea-
sure, measuring deprivation with respect to one dimension only (e.g. disposable income). If
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one wants to consider publicly offered goods such as education as separate from private con-
sumption, a multidimensional FGT measure is needed. Multidimensionality however entails
a difficult question of determining when a person should be determined as deprived.
There are several approaches to multidimensionality of FGT-type poverty measures.19
For example, Besley and Kanbur (1988), who consider the poverty impacts of food subsidies,
employ the uni-dimensional FGT measure but define deprivation in terms of equivalent in-
come: Pα =
´ z
0
(
zE−yE
zE
)α
f(y) d(y), where yE is equivalent income, defined implicitly from
V (p, yE) = V (q, y), and zE is the poverty line corresponding to equivalent income. But given
our aim of defining optimal policy in terms of poverty reduction, irrespective of individual
welfare, the use of equivalent income is problematic as it forces the solution to be such that,
by definition, individuals are kept as well off as before. Pirttilä and Tuomala (2004) em-
ploy shadow prices in a poverty-minimizing context to allow for several goods in the poverty
measure. For them, deprivation is measured as D (z, y (q, w)) where zh = sxx∗ − shLL∗and
yh(q, wh) = sxx(q, wh)−shLL(q, wh). This approach requires determining shadow prices sx, sL
for consumption and leisure in order to construct a reference bundle respective to which de-
privation can be measured, but there is no clear guideline to the choice of the shadow prices.
The approach in Bourguignon and Chakravarty (2003) is more suitable for our purposes.
They provide a multidimensional extension of the FGT measure, according to which a person
is poor if she is deprived in at least one dimension. A simple example of such an extension of
the FGT is
Pθ =
1
n
m∑
j=1
∑
i∈Sj
aj
(
zj − xij
zj
)θj
where θj and aj are weights given to dimension j, and Sj is the group of people who are
poor in dimension j. Alkire and Foster (2011) for their part provide a similar measure which
uses a weighted count of dimensions in which the person is deprived to determine whether
she is poor. An aspect of this is also whether the goods under consideration are complements
or substitutes. Following the Bourguignon-Chakravarty approach and defining xi1 = xi as
private consumption, z1 = x¯, xi2 = G as the amount of public good, and z2 = G¯ would give
us Pθ = 1n
∑
i∈Sj
(
a1
(
x¯−xi
x¯
)θ1 + a2 ( G¯−GG¯ )θ2
)
. Using this measure, Dx = − θ1a1x¯
(
x¯−xi
x¯
)θ1−1
and DG = − θ2a2G¯
(
G¯−G
G¯
)θ2−1. These can then be inserted to the public provision rules. For
example, (3.4) becomes
´ (
θ2a2
G¯
(
G¯−G
G¯
)θ2−1 + θ1a1x¯ ( x¯−xix¯ )θ1−1 (1− τ)∂zi∂G) dν(i)
´
θ1a1
x¯
(
x¯−xi
x¯
)θ1−1 dν(i) = p− τ
dZ
dG
and (A.23) becomes
19See Foster, Greer, and Thorbecke (2010, p.504-5) for a brief overview of multidimensional FGT exten-
sions that allow the inclusions of dimensions such as health, education, and nutrition in addition to other
consumption.
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∑ θ2a2
G¯
(
G¯−G
G¯
)θ2−1 +∑ θ1a1x¯ ( x¯−xix¯ )θ1−1 aziG∑ θ1a1
x¯
(
x¯−xi
x¯
)θ1−1 (1 + azib) =
p− (1− a)∑ ziG
1− (1− a)∑ zib ,
from where it can be seen that the relative efficiency of the public good versus cash
transfers on reducing poverty can be directly traced back to the magnitudes of θ1 and θ2.
B.2 Poverty measurement in the context of commodity taxation
In the case of commodity taxes, we run into the same issues regarding deprivation measure-
ment as with public goods. However, in section 4.2 deprivation was measured only in terms of
disposable income, c. We thus escape the multidimensionality issue and employing the FGT
poverty measure is thus as simple as in the linear income tax case: we simply need to define
D = Pα and thus Dc = −αc¯
(
c¯−ci
c¯
)α−1
in equation (4.4). Potentially the government might
also consider weighting different goods according to their importance to measured poverty.
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